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Central Asia on fire
THE ‘TULIP’ revolution that took place in Kirghizia
in the spring of this year, and the uprising and massacre that shook
Uzbekistan, followed the earlier ‘orange’ and ‘rose’ revolutions in
Ukraine and Georgia. Although they had similar political and social
causes, there are also important differences.
Kirghizia, which was ruled by Askar Akayev from the
early 1990s until his overthrow, had been at the forefront of the
neo-liberal onslaught, implementing the dictates of the IMF, World Bank
and other institutions. The result has been de-industrialision and the
collapse of the agricultural sector, the mainstay of the economy of this
mountainous country. Kirghizia joining the WTO amounted to little more
than plunder. Its GDP is now only $2.3 billion, external debt is $1.6
billion. Economists warn that servicing the debt will absorb the lion’s
share of resources and leave no money for the social sphere, let alone
development. The average monthly wage can buy 2.5 kilos of meat and 16
loaves of bread. Rural youth have flooded into the cities, where they
either push up the already dramatic level of unemployment or wait to
emigrate. Of a population of five million, 700,000 Kyrgyz live abroad,
mainly in Russia and Kazakhstan.
The introduction of capitalism worsened the struggle
between northern and southern clans, activated Uzbek national struggle
around the city of Osh, and strengthened the corruption of the ruling
clique around Akayev. There has been a huge redistribution of wealth
from the poor to the rich.
February’s elections to the Kenesh (parliament)
acted as the detonator of the uprising. Manipulation by the ruling
clique saw the parliament packed by relatives and hangers-on of the
hated Akayev. This led to an explosion of protest across the country. In
the southern cities of Osh, Talas, Tash, Kumyre and Naryne protesters,
including peasants, youth, pensioners and workers, seized government
buildings. The demonstrators included many young women, partly because
males from 20-40 years old were abroad trying to earn enough money to
support their families. When buildings were seized in Zhalal-Bade in
mid-March, a Council for People’s Rule in the region was formed. This
encouraged further seizures throughout the country. Courtrooms, police
stations and airports were occupied. Main roads were blockaded. As the
movement spread, the army began to come out in support of the uprising.
Soon protests reached the capital, Bishkek.
Initially, a demonstration mainly of university students was broken up
by riot police, hundreds of youth arrested. But their parents laid siege
to police headquarters. The following day, even more assembled,
including large numbers of school students. They occupied the central
square outside parliament. A group of 500 ‘sportsmen’ had been armed
with wooden clubs and stones by the regime. A bloody conflict broke out,
which was only resolved when thousands of opposition supporters arrived
from other areas. Opposition leaders did everything they could to
prevent the crowd from occupying the parliament, but protesters broke
through the chain of riot police and Akayev’s armed supporters. That
day, Akayev fled the country.
During the night, the masses organised the armed
defence of the parliament building and held a meeting of regional
representatives in the government’s cabinet office. They elected
leaders, afraid that ‘the official opposition would betray them’. The
following day, they prevented the parliament from meeting. They also
condemned the overnight looting of supermarkets as a provocation
organised by pro-Akayev forces to justify the use of the army.
Despite these tremendous initiatives, they had no
alternative of their own. They literally forced petrified members of the
so-called opposition to take power. When the new acting premier,
Kurmanbek Bakiev, leader of the People’s Movement, tried to recognise
the parliament, demonstrators said: ‘If he wanted, he could go and join
Akayev’.
The new authorities did all they could to calm and
disarm the masses, while trying to defend the interests of the
financiers and clan leaders. They did nothing to change in any
significant way the economic and social policies that had led to the
uprising in the first place. However, the street had spoken. Pickets,
demonstrations, strikes of energy and transport workers, have become
part of everyday life. The tulip revolution has not been completed. As
class and social divisions become sharper, and new political forces
develop, there will be new revolutionary convulsions.
Bakiev’s government is weak, finding itself between
the hammer and the anvil. The conservative and counter-revolutionary
clans are unhappy as they see him as a barrier to their revenge. The
masses are still demanding changes. There have been seizures of land
from landowners, occupations of workplaces, opencast mines and markets.
In the middle of June, there was an attempted pro-Akayev armed coup.
This was supported by the Kazakh secret police, petrified the tulips
will spread to neighbouring Kazakhstan. Even Bakiev’s victory in July’s
presidential election does not indicate his popularity. It only
demonstrates the absence of a genuine political alternative capable of
offering the masses a solution to their numerous problems.
Unfortunately, the two ‘communist’ parties have demonstrated their
bankruptcy by supporting Bakiev.
The events in the Uzbek part of the Fergana Valley
in May are linked to those in Kirghizia. The Osh region is home to
thousands of ethnic Uzbeks and is only a short distance from Andizhan,
where Uzbek authorities opened fire on demonstrators, killing between
700 and 1,000 people. The same root causes – social and economic
catastrophe, the collapse of industry, corruption and vicious political
repression – are behind the uprising.
There are over 10,000 political prisoners in
Uzbekistan. Many of these are from secular, pro-US organisations, such
as Erk, Birlik, and Sun Opposition. Organisations such as the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizbut-Tahrir are underground. The country
had already been shaken by a series of protests by market traders and
even strikes in the second half of 2004. In March of this year there
were explosions outside the US and Israeli embassies in Tashkent. In
May, hundreds of women and children set up a tent protest outside the US
embassy, with placards demanding an end to poverty, unemployment,
repression and police arbitrariness. Many of those who participated were
fed up at losing their husbands and sons, who were working in Russia.
This protest was broken up by riot police using live rounds. There was
an attempted coup by Islamists at the end of June.
The events in Andizhan were provoked by the trial of
23 small businessmen, accused of anti-constitutional activities and
supporting the underground Islamist organisation, Akramiya. Relatives
organised a sit-down protest for four months outside the court. On the
day when the sentence was due to be read, they organised a demonstration
with thousands of participants. Overnight, the local prison was
attacked, prisoners released and a police battalion disarmed. Local
government buildings were seized. The next day, over 50,000
demonstrated, demanding the resignation of president Islam Karimov, and
for jobs and freedom. Women cried out: ‘Better to die than live like
this’.
Troops opened fire and between 500 and 1,000
peaceful protesters were brutally massacred. Several hundred managed to
cross the Kyrgyz border where they claimed asylum. Karimov claims – and,
in the immediate aftermath of the massacre, was supported by the US
State Department – that this was an Islamic uprising. But this is not
so. It was an explosion of mass discontent at poverty, hunger, injustice
and state violence.
Uzbekistan’s neighbours (except Kirghizia) rushed to
assist Karimov, refusing the right to asylum and handing over opposition
supporters. The leadership of Kazakhstan was initially shocked and took
steps to strengthen the police and army. It began to train and arm
groups of unaccountable ‘sportsmen’ and security guards, controlled by
the country’s oligarchs. The first joint Chinese-Russian military
exercises in August practised the invasion of a small, unnamed country,
‘wracked by ethnic and social conflict’. Imperialist powers have been
confused by these events. They even express doubts about how pro-western
the new Kyrgyz regime is.
What conclusions can be drawn? The restoration of
capitalism has caused social and economic disaster. A new phase in the
struggle between different clan and economic interests has opened up.
Multi-national companies and imperialist powers are actively intervening
in this process. The ruling regimes and their state structures are so
rotten that even the slightest push by the masses sees them collapse in
piles of dust.
For the first time since the mid-1990s, there has
been a wave of social protests. This will lead to the emergence of a new
layer of political and worker activists. This offers the opportunity of
establishing a genuine workers’ alternative that can provide a solution
to the problems faced by the masses. Kirghizia and Andizhan are only the
first shots in what will be a protracted period of instability in the
region.
Ainur Kurmanov
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