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The rusting of the orange revolution
When hundreds of thousands of people poured onto
the streets of Kiev, Ukraine, a year ago, the mass media greeted the
‘orange revolution’. Optimistic headlines proclaimed the end of corrupt
rule, and a new era of democracy, as a series of other ‘revolutions’
followed. In reality, little changed, except the faces at the top. ROB
JONES reports.
A YEAR AGO, twelve months after former Georgian
president Eduard Shevardnaze was overthrown in the so-called ‘rose
revolution’, Victor Yushenko came to power as the president of Ukraine
after the ‘orange revolution’. In March this year, president Askar
Akayev of Kirghizia was overthrown in the ‘tulip revolution’. Hardly is
there now a state in the former Soviet bloc in which the opposition has
not talked about a coloured revolution of its own – chestnut shaded in
Moldova, watermelon flavoured in Azerbaijan and, with what the Russian
regime calls the ‘orange plague’ spreading, even the cedar revolution in
the Lebanon.
Whatever the shade, however, it has not taken long
for the fade to set in. On the anniversary of the orange demonstrations
in Kiev, protesters talk of the ‘revolution of fraudulent hopes’. The
growing disillusionment followed from the bitter and open conflict that
broke out at the end of September between Yushenko and Yulia Timoshenko,
his prime minister.
Timoshenko was sacked and has gone into open
opposition after a very public row within the government over corruption
and the reprivatisation of the Nikopolskii steelworks. Despite
introducing a number of populist measures in the immediate aftermath of
the orange protests, living standards have not improved. Even a large
pension increase in the spring backfired because it was almost
immediately absorbed by inflation, leaving those who got the rise no
better off and the rest worse off. The high economic growth rate of over
12% in 2004 has dropped dramatically to about 3% this year.
The Ukrainian press is full of stories of how
Yushenko’s son likes to drive expensive cars and how government
ministers have suddenly acquired expensive yachts. Timoshenko with her
$2,000 handbags is no better. Now the SBU, Ukraine’s successor to the
KGB, has announced a special commission to investigate corruption in
upper government circles.
This open conflict within the ruling elite, however,
is largely about dividing the spoils of privatised industry, although it
is worsened by the deal that was made in December 2004 by outgoing
president, Leonid Kuchma, and Yushenko to reduce presidential powers and
increase those of the parliament. These changes come into force early
next year, and the different wings are lining up to strengthen their
positions in parliament which, in future will elect the president.
In what some call a counter-revolution, Yushenko
made a pact with the pro-Yanukovich deputies to ensure that his
replacement for Timoshenko was approved by parliament. This reflects the
cynical nature of Ukrainian politicians. After all, only a year ago,
Yushenko turned Victor Yanukovich into the personification of all that
was corrupt and undemocratic in Ukraine. But Yanukovich is also the
foremost representative of Russian interests, and the coming together of
the two Victors reflects the realisation that, despite the illusions
propagated by the leaders of the orange revolution, the country will not
quickly be welcomed into the EU.
The lack of meaningful reforms, corruption
allegations, the slowdown in the economy and splits in his government
have led to Yushenko’s popularity plummeting. An opinion poll in
November showed only 14% of the population support him, a drop from 47%
in February; 58% no longer believe in the promises of the orange
revolution, and 60% believe the country is on the wrong path. Pro-Yanukovich
parties are currently heading the polls in the run-up to next March’s
parliamentary elections. Yushenko’s Faustian pact with Kuchma last
December could find him ousted by the new parliament without having
served two years of his presidency.
In Georgia, disappointment with Mikhail Saakashvili
is growing. There has been little reduction in corruption levels,
unemployment is still high, poverty overwhelming. According to Amnesty
International, two years after the revolution, Georgian police use
electric shocks, cigarette and candle burns, and place gun barrels in
detainees’ mouths to torture prisoners. Such methods are becoming more
widespread.
But perhaps most importantly, Saakashvili has proved
incapable of solving the division of Georgia caused by the refusal of
the Russian-speaking regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to accept
central rule. The sensitivity of the question was graphically
demonstrated when UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, paid a flying visit
to the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, on his way back from Pakistan.
Saakashvili, after announcing he would not allow the republics to act
outside of central control, urged the UN to take a more active role in
defending the territorial integrity of Georgia. Making general
statements about the UN’s commitment to ensure both sides observe human
rights, Annan excused himself from the planned lunch and rushed back to
the airport.
The bazaar economy
MAYBE THE MOST bitter disillusionment is found in
Kirghizia. One driver graphically complained: "There’s no future in
Kirghizia. We threw that lot out, but they had already robbed all they
needed for themselves and their relatives. Now this new lot is starting
the thieving all over again!" He repeated what is frequently heard: "I
want to live in Kazakhstan! Living is better there, there’s more money
and stability. I’m afraid of war here!"
The comic Ali G has created a furor in Kazakhstan
with his somewhat crude depiction of Kazakh life. It says much that in
Kirghizia, many look on their northern neighbour as a heaven. Kirghizia
has been ravaged by neo-liberalism since the early 1990s and the new
government has not changed course. In most towns, industry has all but
disappeared. Wage levels of those in work are unbelievable. According to
official statistics, the average wage is 1,300 som a month (€26). But
this figure includes the wages of the elite. The official minimum wage
is 200 som a month (€4). Fully-trained school teachers get a basic wage
of just 300 som (€6). The little industry that does exist is in a
precarious state. Indicative is the fact that the local population has
been blockading the roads to the main gold mine after a cyanide spill
polluted their river. These factors help to explain why over a quarter
of the republic’s population has decided to travel abroad to Kazakhstan
or Russia to find work.
Local people depict the economy not as ‘market’ but
as ‘bazaar’. Most people earn their living either by trading goods from
nearby China, or by subsistence farming in the mountainous rural areas.
Ethnic tensions are high as many of the more successful traders are
ethnic Russians who can travel freely to Russia, whilst the numerous
Chinese traders are treated as second-class citizens. In the south, the
existence of large Tajik, Uighur and Uzbek populations raise the tension
further. These factors are compounded by divisive clan interests between
northern and southern Kirghizia.
Kurmanbek Bakiev, who took over after Akayev fled
the country, represents both the southern clans and also the rich
business elite. In the early 1990s, he headed the republican
privatisation committee and, in 2000, was premier until he was sacked by
Akayev after riots broke out in the south over the transfer of a large
tract of land to China. Apart from his own personal enrichment, Bakiev
gives the impression of not having a clear programme to rule the
country. Pressurised by the Communist Party, he has accepted that
natural resources should be state owned. There is, however, no chance of
this being implemented.
Unexpectedly sucked into the political vacuum left
by the tulip revolution, Bakiev found himself in power. But by June,
opposition protesters around Felix Kulov were storming the parliament in
what some have called an attempted coup aimed at bringing Akayev back to
power. In the middle of November, a further shooting battle took place
near the parliament.
Concerned he would lose power in July’s presidential
election, Bakiev did a deal with his main opponent Kulov, who is also
from the tulip camp. They ran as a ‘tandem’ with the latter promised the
prime minister’s post. Kulov, a northerner formerly head the republic’s
secret police, was once Akayev’s loyal lieutenant until imprisoned on
charges of corruption and the misuse of power.
Although having a more clearly defined neo-liberal
programme than Bakiev, Kulov is significantly more popular and is
proving hard to control. Many now think he has made common ground with
Akayev and his former supporters. It is certainly true that a large
number of the leading members of the former regime once again hold
positions of power. The new authorities are petrified that protests will
grow out of control. The country’s chief justice complained: "The wave
of illegal demonstrations and protest acts, often accompanied by mass
disorder, looting and violence are threatening to turn into a steadily
growing process of illegal behaviour representing a serious threat to
the state and social order". Indeed, in the past weeks, there have been
over 2,000 protests meetings throughout the country.
Democracy & oil
A YEAR AGO, the imperialist powers were gloating at
the apparently unstoppable orange steamroller crushing anyone who stood
up to Western interests. Kirghizia served as a certain check on their
jubilations, if for no other reason than that the overthrow of Akayev
left them with Bakiev, who the West was not sure would be better. After
all, Akayev had been the most pro-Western of the former Soviet leaders,
with the possible exception of Boris Yeltsin. His relations with the
West cooled not for ideological reasons, but because he was out of step
with the mood of the population of Kirghizia, inclined to be
pro-Russian.
After the massacre in July in Andizhan, Uzbekistan,
however, the Uzbek regime has broken sharply with the West, asking the
US to evacuate its airfields. The Shanghai Association, uniting China,
Russia and the Central Asian states, now demands that the US leaves all
airbases in the region within six months. But for now, Kirghizia still
allows its airbases to be used. Indeed, flying into Bishkek airport, you
find the runway lined with a dozen or so US mid-air fuel tankers and a
couple of huge black painted Galaxy transport aircraft.
This experience, in addition to the unwillingness to
provoke instability in countries in which the ruling elites have proved
to be extremely pragmatic in their relations with imperialism, has made
the West much more circumspect about intervening, either in Azerbaijan’s
recent parliamentary election or in December’s vote in Kazakhstan. Not
surprisingly, both countries are key oil producers.
For the last decade, US imperialism has firmly
allied itself with, firstly president Geidar Aliyev, then his son, Ilham,
who took over when his father died. This relationship paid fruit with
this year’s opening of the new pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey. Up to
1% of the world’s oil supply will flow along this route, avoiding Russia
and undermining Russian interests in the Caucasus. US hypocrisy is clear
for all to see. Despite claiming to spread democracy throughout the
world, when its interests are defended by a dictatorial regime in an oil
producing country, the US puts oil ahead of democracy. The election in
2003, which saw Ilham Aliyev succeed his father, can only be described
as fraudulent. It was accompanied by ballot rigging, monopoly access for
Aliyev to the mass media and the brutal clubbing of thousands of
opposition demonstrators.
But the huge oil wealth, which has led to growth
rates of 13% and 14% in the past two years, does not filter down to the
population. Billions of dollars go into the coffers of the
multinationals whilst most of the rest ends up in the pockets of the
corrupt ruling elite. The average wage of the rest of the population is
just €40 a month.
In Azerbaijan, the opposition has been seriously
disappointed by the lack of support from the so-called disciples of
democracy in the White House and EU. It is true that the West did waver,
worried that if Aliyev remained in power, a social explosion or a new
ethnic conflict (mirroring the Nagorno Karabakh conflict) could explode.
After the rose and orange revolutions it appeared for a while that the
West would back the watermelon opposition. But opposition hopes were
dashed in November’s parliamentary elections. These were no freer than
previous elections, with widespread fraud and the beating up of
opposition demonstrators. However, the West clearly decided it was
better to stick with the devil they knew, giving little or no support to
the opposition. Needless to say, Aliyev secured a firm majority, leaving
the opposition bitterly complaining about democracy having been sold for
oil. The US was amongst the very first to congratulate him.
In Kazakhstan, where parliamentary elections are due
on 4 December, Western hypocrisy is no less. The neo-liberal
‘democratic’ opposition and the Communist Party have formed, at a
meeting in London, an anti-Nazarbayev bloc: ‘For a Just Kazakhstan’. The
events in Kirghizia boosted hopes of a replay in Alma-Ata. The regime is
worried, even broadcasting a daily TV programme outlining the ‘failures
of the orange plague’. Repression has stepped up with opposition papers
(including that of the CWI) being arrested, opposition candidates ruled
out of the election and a leading opposition activist being shot dead.
Western powers do not want an unstable Kazakhstan.
Since September, US Congressmen, Bill Clinton, Henry Kissinger and
Condoleezza Rice have all paid visits to president Nursultan Nazarbayev
at various times. Rice spoke warmly about "Kazakhstan being the motor
for economic growth in Central Asia". When challenged at a press
conference about the lack of democratic elections, about political
prisoners and the unprecedented pre-election repression, Rice abstractly
commented that if the authorities were to respect democracy they would
liberate the creative energy of the people. This led an opposition paper
to talk again of "democracy being sold out to oil".
West funding NGOs
SUPPORT FOR THE orange revolution has certainly
waned throughout the region. People see few benefits and feel the West
is very selective about supporting democracy. The conflicts within the
ruling elites are raising ethnic tensions in the region. Saakashvili
provokes the breakaway republics in Georgia by sending tanks to police
the borders. The perceived danger of a return of the northern clans to
power through the back door in Kirghizia will only heighten tensions in
the even more impoverished south. Tensions are running very high as the
Ukrainian government is shutting down Russian-speaking schools on the
overwhelmingly Russian Crimean peninsular.
The multi-coloured revolutions have demonstrated
dramatically both the confusion in the region and also the tragic lack
of a political force capable of mobilising the undoubted discontent of
the masses to end the horrors of capitalist rule.
In a distorted form, the protests reflect a
revolutionary striving by the masses to force change. Amongst the
protesters in Kiev last December were those complaining at the
fraudulent elections, at corruption, at the economic conditions or just
‘because we cannot live like this anymore’. That so many are
disappointed is largely because there has been no working class
alternative offered.
The region’s ‘communist’ parties, dominated as they
are by a desire to return to the stability of Soviet times, have been
incapable of leading economic and democratic struggles. Instead, they
have almost all without exception provided a cloak for the neo-liberal
leaders of the orange movements. In Ukraine, the Communist and Socialist
parties formed a bloc with Yushenko rather than offer an independent
class alternative. In Kirghizia, the two communist parties joined with
some smaller petit-bourgeois parties in the ‘Akayev Resign Movement’. In
Kazakhstan, the CP has submerged itself so deeply in the bourgeois
opposition ‘For a Just Kazakhstan’ it has practically disappeared.
This absence of a clear left alternative allows the
West to ferment ‘revolution’ by financing non-governmental organisations
(NGOs). Beginning with Otpor in Serbia, each revolution has seen the
involvement of Western-financed youth groups. In Ukraine, Pora provided
the backbone to the movement. But as one of the activists from the
Kyrgyz ‘Birge’ group explained, their organisation did not understand
what was happening and went into crisis when they saw the rioting and
looting in Bishkek and the victory of Bakiev and Kulov. While most of
these groups have been abandoned by their sponsors, the West is still
pouring large sums into the region to try and bolster its position. One
US group is pouring $3 million just to finance NGOs in the south of
Kirghizia. The people who work in these groups (in Kirghizia there are
over 6,000 NGOs) begin to live in a world isolated from the reality of
life on a few euros a month experienced by the rest of the population.
However, the influx of Western-financed NGOs, in
many ways echoing how CIA fronts influenced the underground socialist
parties in Europe and Latin America in the 1970s, will not prevent
social protests. President Vladimir Putin in Russia has now banned the
financing of NGOs by Western bodies in an attempt to avoid the ‘orange
plague’. But all this will do is lessen the influence of the NGOs on
movements that will inevitably spring up, and lessen their ability to
divert people from the real struggle.
What is really required is a mass working-class,
socialist alternative which can offer solutions to ethnic and clan
divisions, end the rule of the oligarchs, struggle for genuine democracy
and lead the discontented mass of workers and youth in a struggle for a
genuine socialist society.
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