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End of Empire: Memoirs of a Malaysian communist guerrilla leader
My Side of History
By Chin Peng
Published by Media Masters, 2003, £16-99
Reviewed by
Peter Taaffe
CHIN PENG was the leader of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM)
which played an important role in two guerrilla struggles: in the second world
war, and in the post-war twelve-year ‘emergency’, in reality, a war against
British colonial rule in Malaya (now Malaysia). He is clearly a striking
character with an extraordinary story of self-sacrifice to tell. Between 4-5,000
CPM fighters lost their lives in the guerrilla struggle against British
imperialism, while 200 party members were hanged.
British imperialism in Malaya had, before the Japanese
invasion in 1941, pursued a policy of jailing or banishing to their ‘homeland’
suspected communists. Notwithstanding this, following Britain’s capitulation in
1941, a war of national resistance was conducted with the CPM as its backbone.
The British at first tried to find a counterweight to the CPM – because of their
distrust of the social and class base of the party – but insufficient numbers of
Chinese who leant towards Chiang Kai-Shek’s Kuo Min-Tang (KMT) materialised.
Initially, the CPM drew most of its support from the ethnic
Chinese. Although it later involved sections of the Malay and Indian
populations, this was the Achilles heel of the CPM, which was to prove fatal in
the struggle against the British. Chin Peng makes a significant remark in view
of the essentially rural guerrilla struggle that was to be pursued later on:
"The party’s initial operations centred, naturally, on Singapore as there was a
far greater concentration of union movements on the island than anywhere else on
the Malayan peninsula". Membership of the party in the early 1940s was just over
3,000.
At the same time as having a firm industrial base, the party
had begun to dig roots amongst the peasant population. This became useful once
the CPM’s offer to the British to help in the resistance against the Japanese
occupation was taken up. The first detachments of the Malayan Peoples’
Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) were in action against the Japanese occupying forces
from January 1942.
Circumstances during the war compelled the CPM to organise
what was essentially a rural guerrilla struggle because industrial activity had
collapsed. The CPM set up jungle bases from which to harass the Japanese. While
it was developing its rural base, it did not neglect the working class: "In
Sitiawan we had 40 to 50 members. Among the Kinta Valley mining workers we were
soon boasting more than 500 members". At this stage, Chin Peng, 19 years old,
was appointed acting chief of the CPM in the Perak region. In one area,
resistance troops operated from a leper colony. The Japanese feared going near
the settlement and police gave the area a wide berth.
The collaboration of the CPM-led Malayan national resistance
forces with the British worked successfully, but it was always an arm’s length
collaboration. Anticipating future conflict with the British, a CPM underground
army stashed 5,000 weapons in jungle caches, many supplied by the British for
the war against the Japanese. But rather than preparing for a serious struggle
against the British, the programme outlined by the CPM, under the pressure of
its then leader Lai Te, was watered down: from a ‘democratic republic’ of
Malaya, which would involve independence from the British, to ‘self governance’.
Chin Peng and his comrades were imprisoned by the Stalinist theory of ‘stages’:
first bourgeois democracy and independence; and only later could the social
issues, and particularly socialism, be posed. However, only by linking the
struggle of Malayan workers and peasants for independence with the social issues
– freedom, especially from imperialism, land, peace and bread – would the
possibility of real national liberation be posed.
The Russian revolution had demonstrated at the beginning of
the 20th century that in ‘backward countries’, the struggle to carry through
completely the bourgeois-democratic revolution is only possible by linking this
to changing society, eliminating both landlordism and capitalism. Chin Peng
seems to recognise this belatedly. He states that the CPM’s main demand was for
a "democratic government through elections from an electorate drawn from all the
races". But: "I realised the programme amounted to nothing more than a vapid
move to appease the incoming British… [It] made no mention of the goal of
self-determination for the nation".
Lai Te was against militant struggle by the CPM. He
preferred a ‘political posture’, involving "co-operation with the British
coupled with a concentrated effort on the organisation of labour and the
infiltration of the unions". The latter point was correct tactically and was
carried out to some extent. But it was not a question of posing either/or,
military struggle or ‘the organisation of the working class’. Both tactics
should have been pursued in the struggle against re-occupation by the British.
In fact, the possibility was there for a short period in
1945 – following the capitulation of the Japanese and before the arrival of
substantial British forces – for the CPM to mobilise the working class and rural
masses to take power and carry through a social revolution. To achieve this, the
CPM would have had to cut across the ethnic divisions cultivated before the war
by the British and carried on by the Japanese. It seems that the majority of the
Malay population – particularly in the rural areas – tended to be conservative
and swayed by the Malay princes and landlords. But the working-class movement in
the cities could have split the workers and peasants away from the Malay
grandees. This would have involved a call for the peasants to take the land and
drive out the landlords. The CPM would have had to put itself at the head of an
uprising of the working class in the cities, supplemented by a peasant uprising
in the rural areas, uniting Chinese, Malays and Indians on class lines, with the
goal of an independent socialist Malaya, linked to similar struggles throughout
the region.
Such a movement had every chance of success. The British had
not arrived and were stretched militarily. The whole of Asia was in ferment.
Tragically, the course followed by the CPM led to a defeat. The British bided
their time and prepared for a showdown, profiting from the mistakes the CPM
made.
The weakness of its democratic structures – a hallmark of
Stalinist parties – is underlined by Chin Peng. Contrary to popular
understanding fostered by British imperialism, the CPM was not in the pay of the
Russian or Chinese ‘communists’ at this stage. Yet the ‘aura’ of the Comintern
and the methods of Stalinism compelled an unquestioning obedience, which in turn
prepared the ground for betrayals and defeats.
Some Japanese military commanders put out feelers to the CPM
to form a bloc of ‘Asians’ against the colonial white invader. This was rejected
by the CPM leaders despite the fact that the "revolutionary spirit within the
party had never run so high. The greater majority of our guerrilla units had,
for seven days, been preparing for continuing armed struggle that now would
switch to target the returning colonial power". Nonetheless, 400 individual
Japanese joined the guerrillas. This could have become the starting point for
agitation amongst the Japanese forces throughout Asia by a conscious,
particularly working-class, force. Instead, on Lai Te’s orders, most of the
Japanese who had joined the guerrillas were executed.
The CPM was drawn in to defend villages from attacks by
Malays, resulting in substantial deaths of Malays, not disguised by Chin Peng.
These events played into the hands of the British, who fomented divisions
between the different ethnic groups.
British imperialism was able to begin to reconsolidate its
rule with the establishment of a ‘temporary government’, the British Military
Administration (BMA). Seeking to appease the CPM, some of its representatives
were drawn onto the BMA, a reward for not conducting a struggle against British
re-occupation. The guerrillas’ intention was to demobilise, handing over 4,000
weapons while secretly burying more in jungle caches for future use.
British occupation brought economic blunders. The Japanese
occupation currency was declared valueless, reducing the vast majority of the
labouring population to paupers. Food supplies dwindled and prices soared. An
embittered population became increasingly hostile to the returning colonials and
Malaya became a "cauldron of simmering discontent". The CPM, rather than using
this to organise national resistance against the British, "moved to impose a
moderating effect and respect for order by encouraging the formation of people’s
committees". At the same time, clubs, unions and organisations for workers, for
women and young people sprouted.
The actions of the British authorities provoked massive
working-class opposition, with the first dock strike in Singapore, followed by
wharf labourers. These strikes were for increased pay but also against handling
ships carrying arms for Dutch troops who were then fighting nationalist forces
in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia). The BMA used Japanese prisoners of war
and certain British military units as strike breakers. This upsurge in
working-class opposition resulted in the formation of the Singapore General
Labour Union (SGLU) with a claimed strength of 200,000 members.
Women paraded through the streets demanding rice and a
government subsidy of $20 to rescue families from destitution. The British
authorities – with a ‘Labour’ government under prime minister Clement Attlee –
met this with force, shooting down demonstrators.
In the midst of all of this, Chin Peng was given the Burma
Star and, a little later, the Order of the British Empire (OBE). But the attempt
to placate the leaders of the CPM failed. It was not long after that this holder
of the OBE was confronting the forces of the British empire.
The prelude to the guerrilla action was the economic and
social turmoil which followed British re-occupation. At the same time, prompted
by Lai Te and the British, a new policy line was proposed for the CPM: setting
up the ‘Malayan Democratic United Front’, a "broad alliance with other political
parties". It dovetailed with steps taken by the CPM to set up the Malay
Nationalist Party (MNP) and the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU). These steps,
together with the beginning of the formation of what later became the United
Malay National Organisation (UMNO – an amalgamation of 41 Malay associations led
by Datuk Onn bin Jaafar), laid the basis for the splits between different ethnic
groups.
In 1946-47 and the first half of 1948, a massive strike wave
erupted, causing extensive disruption to rubber plantations, tin mines and
merchant shipping. Alarmed, the British urged the arrest of 5,000 suspected
members of the CPM. On 20 October 1947, a massive hartal – a countrywide general
strike involving not just workers but also peasants and the middle classes –
paralysed Singapore and Malaya. According to CPM politburo member, Ah Dian, the
party controlled the plantation workforce, mines, wharves, public transport and
all essential services.
Given this social base amongst the working class, why did
the CPM later resort essentially to a rural guerrilla struggle? One reason is
that it did not seize the initiative at the end of the war to launch a
revolutionary struggle for national and social liberation. But even in 1947, as
these strikes indicate, a new opportunity was presented to the CPM to organise
the struggle, based primarily on the working class but drawing in the rest of
the population, to evict British imperialism. Moreover, this movement cut across
social and ethnic divisions. Unfortunately, the CPM did not have the programme
or perspectives to utilise this position, trapped as it was within the framework
of Stalinist ideas.
The government introduced the Federation of Malaya on 4
February 1948, a blow to the CPM’s perspective of national independence. This
set in train the decision of the CPM to engage in rural guerrilla warfare. To
say the least, this was a questionable conclusion to draw from the experiences
of the Malayan workers and peasants.
The CPM was clearly influenced by the success of Mao Zedong
in the Chinese revolution. But while the struggle was heroic, a defeat ensued
because the CPM lacked a clearly worked-out perspective. Chin Peng gives the
statistics on the population of Malaya at the time: "5.8 million people, of whom
2.2m were Malays, another 2.6m were Chinese and a further 600,000 were Indians".
Moreover, why engage in a guerrilla war, by its very nature focussed in rural
areas, when such an important class base had been established in the cities and
urban areas, as well as in the countryside? The guerrilla struggle of Mao Zedong
was itself an echo of the defeat of the Chinese revolution of 1925-27, which was
a product of the false policies of Joseph Stalin and the Russian bureaucracy.
The aim of the CPM was to establish not a socialist regime
but – as in China, Vietnam and Eastern Europe – a ‘people’s democratic republic’
of Malaya. Chin Peng says: "In hindsight, I think we made another critical
mistake here. What we should have done was to announce our aim of fighting for
the broad concept of independence. This approach should have gone on to
emphasise independence for all political persuasions and all races. Our battle
cry should have been: Independence for Malaya and all Malayans who want
independence".
Here is a tacit recognition that the CPM’s struggle was
based mostly on the ethnic Chinese, although episodically it got some support
from the other ethnic populations. But even this admission is deficient. A mere
call for independence, within the confines of capitalism, would not have been
sufficient to mobilise the ethnically divided masses. The only way to really
unite the majority of all races is to appeal on a class basis by putting forward
a concrete programme on economic, social and ethnic issues, linked to
independence but in the context of a socialist Malaya and a socialist
confederation of the region.
Some of the most interesting chapters deal with the methods
of the British in successfully curtailing the guerrilla war. Lieutenant-General
Harold Briggs was its rather reluctant director of operations. His plan involved
the establishment of ‘new villages’ throughout Malaya. These were fenced,
patrolled and fortified centres, illuminated at night and continually monitored
by day. They complemented the policy of dividing the population along ethnic
lines, and isolated them as a possible source of food for the guerrillas.
The author admits that attracting significant numbers of
Malays to the guerrilla forces and, more importantly, support from the poorest
sections, was crucial to the success of this struggle. He states: "In a
six-month period from late 1949 to early 1950, we were able to attract more than
500 Malay recruits". Unfortunately, when they were attacked by KMT bandits
organised by the British High Command, they melted away or were captured.
Isolated, with dwindling food supplies, the guerrillas faced a brick wall: "The
realisation that a military approach from late 1948 through to 1951 had been
utterly inappropriate was a bitter pill to swallow".
Chin Peng deals with the repressive methods of the British
at length. He reproduces the famous photograph that first appeared in the Daily
Worker (the then paper of the British Communist Party) on 10 May 1952. It showed
a British soldier holding the severed heads of two guerrillas. Truly, the
barbaric al-Qa’ida inspired terrorist groups in Iraq had good teachers in the
form of British imperialism in Malaya, Kenya and elsewhere in the past. But by
1953, almost five years since the guerrilla struggle to evict the British began,
"it was very obvious we held no territory, no liberated zones". The guerrillas
were forced northwards over the border to Siam, now Thailand.
The guerrilla movement was running into the sand but it had
taken a heavy toll on British resources. Together with processes in the rest of
Asia and Africa, the outright military domination of the ‘colonies’ was becoming
unviable. Serious reforms are always a by-product of revolution. In a sense,
even the failed guerrilla struggle in Malaya exerted big pressure on the British
to loosen its grip on the peninsula.
UMNO had begun to emerge as a significant force, under the
leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman, pressing for a kind of staged process of
‘independence’. Moreover, Tunku had indicated a "non-communal approach to
politics", reversing the unrelenting Malay nationalist programme of UMNO of only
two years before, consolidating a broad nationalist front involving the Malayan
Indian Congress as well as other Malayan organisations. All of this compelled
the CPM to undertake peace negotiations. The Baling talks, although initially
unsuccessful, were a staging post along the road towards the winding-up of the
guerrilla force. The CPM refused to accept proposals for its complete
capitulation, insisting on recognition of its struggle and fighting for the
possibility of political space within the new set-up. However, the British had
concluded that the humiliation of the CPM was necessary, particularly in view of
the ongoing battles unfolding in Indo-China, above all Vietnam.
Despite the weaknesses of the CPM, it struggled on until
1987 when successful ‘peace negotiations’ began in the Thai resort of Phuket.
When all hostilities ceased, the total number of CPM members was 1,188: 694 were
Thai-born and 494 claimed Malaysian origin. They were given temporary grants and
promised integration into Malaysia. Chin Peng never returned officially to
Malaysia but has continued his exile in Thailand up to the time of the
publication of this book.
Despite his experiences and the bitter pill of ultimate
defeat, Chin Peng restates his faith in the socialist future for Malaysia and
the world. The tragedy of those like him and his followers was that they were
trapped within a Stalinist framework. Their heroic struggle was doomed, partly
because of the objective circumstances – which were not a simple replication of
China or Vietnam – and partly through the mistakes, some honestly admitted, by
Chin Peng and the CPM leadership.
My Side of History is full of lessons for those seeking the
correct means of struggle against capitalism in Malaysia and worldwide. It is a
cautionary tale about the limits of guerrilla war. Those with a keen eye will
seek out the lessons of this important book, the role of the working class in
the socialist revolution, the need for democracy in the parties that fight for
such an idea, and the absolute necessity for workers’ democracy in the state
that ushers from a revolution, in transition between capitalism and socialism.
We can salute those who heroically fought against British imperialism. But the
new generation, standing on their shoulders, must learn the lessons in preparing
for the new socialist future.
The full text of this review, of which this is a substantially edited
version, is available on:
At the invitation of the PSM, Peter Taaffe recently spoke at a series of
meetings in Malaysia.
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