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Falklands war: what lessons for the labour movement?
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS ago Britain fought a five-week war
with Argentina over the Falkland Islands or Las Islas Malvinas. The war
was precipitated by the occupation of the islands by the military regime
of general Galtieri, who launched the ill-prepared military adventure in
a desperate attempt to escape from internal economic and political
crisis. Galtieri had been shaken by general strikes and mass protests.
The conflict was prepared, however, by a series of
blunders by British imperialism. Despite Argentina’s long-standing claim
to the islands and recent threats from Galtieri, in 1981 Thatcher’s
government announced the withdrawal of the British naval warship,
Endurance, from the South Atlantic. Her government took no action when
scrap metal contractors landed on neighbouring South Georgia with an
Argentinean naval escort in March 1982 – and Thatcher was completely
taken by surprise when Argentinean forces occupied the Falklands/Malvinas
on 1 April.
Then, acting decisively to defend the prestige of
British imperialism and save her own political neck, Thatcher ordered an
improvised naval task force to sail to the South Atlantic, announcing
this to a special sitting of parliament on Saturday, 3 April. The Labour
leaders endorsed the sending of the task force, a mobilisation for war,
and Thatcher had a free hand to conjure up latent reserves of patriotic
prejudices and chauvinistic jingoism among many layers in Britain, with
plenty of help from the tabloid press.
The war was ‘a close run thing’ (as Wellington said
at Waterloo) but, with the help of Reagan in the US and Pinochet in
Chile, British forces re-took the Falklands/Malvinas on 14 June.
The ranks of the armed forces on both sides paid a
heavy price for the reckless militarism of their rulers: 258 British
forces killed and 777 wounded; 649 Argentineans killed, 1,068 wounded.
One incident stands out as an undoubted war crime: the sinking by a
British nuclear-powered submarine, ordered by Thatcher, of the decrepit
Argentinean warship, General Belgrano, when it was sailing away from the
Falklands and posed no threat to British forces: 368 sailors drowned.
The Galtieri junta was forced out by mass protests
and thrown into prison. Thatcher’s mistakes, on the other hand, were
brushed under the carpet. Military victory transformed her position.
During 1979-81 the Tory government was deeply unpopular, as its
monetarist economic policies aggravated the recession and attacks on
jobs and trade union rights sent unemployment soaring. Thatcher’s own
poll ratings slumped. But the ‘Falklands effect’, the mobilisation of
buried patriotic sentiments apparently vindicated by military victory,
dramatically lifted the level of support for the Tories and for Thatcher
in particular.
The Labour leaders under Michael Foot supported the
sending of the task force – effectively approving the voyage to war. As
a consequence, they were incapable of countering the Falklands effect
(concentrating their energies during 1982-83 on attacking the Marxist
wing of the party, expelling members of the Militant editorial board in
1983). Thatcher surfed to a landslide victory in the 1983 general
election. She increased her majority by a hundred seats, to 144, though
this actually concealed a decline in support for the Tories, who
received 700,000 fewer votes than in 1979.
What position did we take on the war? We opposed
both British imperialism and the Argentinean military dictatorship. Both
sides were fighting a capitalist war contrary to the interests of the
working class.
We opposed the seizure of the Malvinas by Galtieri
as a military adventure. If the junta had successfully taken long-term
possession of the Malvinas, the dictatorship would have been
strengthened for a period, which would have worsened the position of the
Argentinean working class. At the same time, we opposed the sending of
the military task force, which was to defend the power and prestige of
British imperialism. It was predictable that a British victory would
strengthen Thatcher and embolden her attacks on the working class at
home.
Moreover, we opposed the class collaborationist role
of the Labour leaders, who abjectly failed to oppose the war, instantly
clearing the way for Thatcher to dispatch the task force. The Militant’s
editorial on 9 April was headed ‘No support for the Junta – No support
for the Tories’.
"Workers can give no support whatsoever to the
lunatic adventure now being prepared by the Thatcher government…" it
declared. "The Labour Party and the trade union movement could stop
Thatcher dead in her tracks. The labour movement must declare that it
has no confidence whatsoever in the policies or methods of the British
government…
"Labour must demand not just the resignation of
Defence Minister Nott, but the entire Tory government… Labour must
demand a general election in order that a Labour government can support
and encourage workers’ opposition in Argentina".
The pages of Militant during the conflict make clear
our opposition to the capitalist war over the Falklands/Malvinas. (See
also Peter Taaffe: The Rise of Militant, Chapter 20) Some of our
critics, however, claimed at the time, and probably continue to claim,
that we did not oppose the war. According to such ultra-lefts, only
those who called for the defeat of the British task force and victory
for Argentina really opposed the war. Their approach, in our opinion, is
a ludicrous caricature of a Marxist policy on war; an approach that is
guaranteed to cut its proponents off from even the most politically
conscious workers.
Our strategy and tactics on the Falklands/Malvinas
war, and our answer to ultra-left critics, were explained in an article
by Lynn Walsh, Falklands war: what lessons for the labour movement?,
published in Militant International Review (Issue 22, June 1982), as the
task force sailed towards the South Atlantic. We believe that the
programmatic and theoretical issues raised at that time remain important
issues for Marxists today.
This online version is the original article in full.
The version published in Socialism Today, Issue No.108, April 2007, has
been slightly shortened for reasons of space. Some explanatory footnotes
and subheadings have been added to the original.
WAR IS RAGING in the South Atlantic. By the time
this journal appears, the outcome of the conflict will probably be
decided. Most likely, the Junta’s forces will suffer a defeat, given the
superior military and economic resources of British imperialism. This
would open up a new revolutionary crisis in Argentina, which could
trigger movements of the working class through the crisis-ridden states
of Latin America. [1] But whether or not the military conflict is as yet
resolved, the war has important lessons for the labour movement. What
were the real causes of the war? All the political, economic and class
forces must be analysed concretely. And what policy and tactics should
Marxists adopt in opposition to capitalist war? In the next period of
intensified class conflict and national antagonisms this, even after the
Falklands war, will remain a vital question for the labour movement.
Galtieri seized the islands in a desperate attempt
to save his dictatorship from the threat of revolution. [2] Success
would extend the Junta’s lease of life, reinforcing temporarily the
totalitarian oppression of the Argentinean people. Success for Galtieri
would also mean that the Falkland Islanders would be brought under the
jackboot of the dictatorship, which socialists cannot condone.
But what confidence can we have, from the point of
view of the interests of the working class, in the Tory government’s
moves to solve the crisis? For the Tories and for their big-business
pay-masters the Islanders are just pawns in the game. [3] Thatcher has
sent the Task Force to war to defend the prestige, power, and ultimately
the world-wide profits of British capitalism.
The first casualties of the war are the workers in
uniform. In Argentina, the young conscripts of the army and navy have
been pressed into service by a military police dictatorship. The sailors
and soldiers of the British Task Force are ‘volunteers’, but volunteers
who have mostly been pushed into the forces by mass unemployment and
poor prospects in ‘Civvy Street’, a form of ‘economic conscription’. The
fighting has already claimed many lives, and thousands more may be
slaughtered or wounded in the battle for the Islands.
Whatever the outcome, the arms dealers, the
merchants of death who equip both sides (10% of Argentina’s arms
purchases are from Britain), will increase their profits. On both sides,
it is the power, prestige and profits of the capitalist class which are
at stake. The survival of Galtieri’s Junta and Thatcher’s government
also hangs on the outcome. Once Galtieri embarked on the Falklands
adventure and once Thatcher embarked on massive retaliation, neither
could back down without losing power.
Reagan [4] viewed with dismay the conflict between
the two allies, in reality two client states. Ultimately, it was
inevitable that US imperialism would side with British imperialism, a
major ally and the linchpin of the NATO alliance. However, it was with
great regret that Reagan abandoned support for Galtieri, once the
futility of Haig’s shuttle-diplomacy became clear. [5] Not only has a
southern picket of American imperialism been thrown off balance, but the
Junta’s role as surrogate policeman in Central America – vital for
Reagan after Congress’s refusal to sanction direct intervention in El
Salvador – has been put in question. [6]
Above all, however, the representatives of US
imperialism fear that the Falklands adventure will lead to Galtieri’s
fall – opening the door to a new revolutionary crisis in Argentina, with
all the consequences that would have for Latin America.
Galtieri’s motives for war…
THE IRONY OF the situation is, however, that
Galtieri embarked on the invasion of the Falklands precisely to head off
the imminent threat of revolution. A few days before the invasion, on
March 30, thousands of workers and youth defied the military on the
streets of Buenos Aires, protesting against massive impoverishment and
unemployment and against the brutal suppression of the trade unions and
all democratic rights.
The ‘strong state’ of Videla, Viola and Galtieri has
failed to solve the country’s deep economic crisis. On the contrary,
production has slumped while the wealth of this potentially rich nation
has been shamelessly squandered in an orgy of speculation. Under the
mismanagement of her voracious financiers and businessmen, Argentina,
with a population 9 million smaller than Poland, has run up $5,000
million more in foreign debts, which now total $30,000 million (£18,000
million). The working class, together with the unemployed, the rural
labourers, and sections of the petit-bourgeoisie, have been devastated
by wage freezes and soaring prices. The monetarist policies of
Galtieri’s finance minister, Alemann, far from curing inflation, gave a
new twist to Argentina’s notorious hyper-inflation.
On top of this, amplifying all the economic
grievances, is the workers’ burning anger at the suppression of
democratic rights and the military’s brutal policy of kidnappings,
assassinations, and torture. Over 20,000 people have ‘disappeared’,
murdered or jailed by the Junta’s official murderers and torturers.
After six years of a bonapartist regime which uses fascist methods
against its opponents, a new generation of class fighters were beginning
to lead the workers into action. This is why Galtieri activated the
state’s 150-year-old claim to the ‘Malvinas’, using this national
talisman to whip up all the most reactionary, chauvinist sentiments
among the petit-bourgeois and sections of the working class.
Despite their bloody hands, the Junta – temporarily
– have managed to divert the anger of the masses away from the
dictatorship and turn it against British imperialism. Nevertheless, even
the demonstrations of support for the seizure of the Islands have
manifested opposition to the repressive policies of the Junta.
The working class has nothing to gain from the
taking of Falklands. If the Junta succeeds in holding them and its
adventure appears a success, the dictatorship would be reinforced,
prolonging the military-police oppression of the Argentinean people, at
least for a time.
Moreover, if Argentinean big business were to try to
develop the Islands, and from there the wealth of Antarctica, the
financiers and speculators would be the only real beneficiaries. Far
from ‘strengthening the nation’, the development of the Falklands, if
Argentina’s profligate capitalists were to attempt it, would only
increase the country’s dependence on foreign capital. Possession of the
Islands will not halt Argentina’s catastrophic economic degeneration.
Only a socialist Argentina, with planned production under the control of
the working class and links with the rest of Latin America through a
Socialist Federation, could develop the plentiful natural resources of
Antarctica. Then, too, the problem of the Falklands could be resolved.
The Islanders would have no fears about a Socialist Federation which
guaranteed their democratic rights and autonomy, and assured them
comfortable conditions of life.
Annexation by the Argentinean dictatorship, however,
is an entirely different question. Marxists cannot be indifferent to the
fate of the Falklanders. Although they have dwindled to about 1,800 –
hardly a nation in the classical sense – they have the right to enjoy
their own language, culture, and autonomy. We cannot condone their
subjection by the dictatorship, represented on the Islands by the new
military governor, General Menendez, veteran of the Junta’s ‘dirty war’
of extermination against the guerrilla groups who took up arms against
the regime.
… and Thatcher’s
BUT WHAT CONFIDENCE can we have in the Tory
government’s moves to resolve the crisis? The Task Force has been sent,
if we are to believe Thatcher, to safeguard the Falkland Islanders’
rights and defend British democracy against ‘fascist’ Argentina. Yet
before, the Tories were quite happy to sanction arms sales to the Junta,
and were silent about repression.
Thatcher’s, moreover, is a Tory government which at
home has declared war on the living standards and rights of the working
class. If the Tories are prepared to dispatch a mighty war fleet –
boasting that it is ‘regardless of cost’ – it is not to defend the
rights of Falklanders, but to defend the power and prestige of British
capitalism.
Before, they had little regard for the Islanders.
Britain’s refusal to develop the Islands’ services had already made the
Falklanders more and more dependent on Argentina, for the air service,
supplies, education and medical treatment. The Islanders had their own
way of life, but the place was run more like a feudal fiefdom than a
modern democracy. Most of the Islands’ economy is dominated by a single
company, the Falklands Islands Co, recently bought by Coalite Ltd, no
doubt with an eye on the region’s mineral resources.
Neglect of a dependency is one thing. But when it
was seized by armed force the power and prestige of British imperialism
was put on the line.
At least one letter to The Times (14 April) cut
through the hypocrisy. "Sir", wrote a certain Hedley Bull [7], "It is
not the case, as is now so widely asserted, that Britain’s chief
interest in the present crisis is to safeguard the rights of Falklanders,
important as these rights are. Britain’s paramount interest is to show
that, contrary to what the Argentine government has believed to be the
case, she is able and willing to defend British territory when it is
attacked". Any negotiated settlement, he concluded, "which... involves a
derogation from British sovereignty... will demonstrate... that Britain
is no longer a power whom anyone need take seriously". The real
standpoint of British capitalism – usually concealed beneath
hypocritical expression of concern about democratic rights – could
hardly be put more clearly.
The point was reinforced, perhaps more
diplomatically, by David Watt, director of the Royal Institute of
International Affairs. "The trouble", he wrote in The Times, "is that
we, a supposedly major power, have been outwitted by a tinpot regime...
Mrs Thatcher is right in saying that Britain’s reputation is at stake".
It was not simply Thatcher’s credibility but the country’s that was at
stake. "Credibility", Watt conceded, "is of course a hard concept to pin
down... But the fact remains that the protection of British interests in
a very uncertain and unstable world depends considerably on exploiting
our past reputation for (a) relative honesty; (b) skill and resolution
in protecting our interests; and (c) possession of real, though limited
power".
As far as the representatives of British imperialism
are concerned "honesty" has indeed always been highly "relative". The
Tory and Foreign Office blunders which encouraged Galtieri to invade the
Falklands, moreover, indicate an undermining of their "skill and
resolution", reflecting the decline of British capitalism’s world power.
[8] But, of course, ultimately the ability to uphold its interest
through armed force is vital to British imperialism, to preserve the
vestiges of its world power.
If it had simply relinquished the Falklands, bowing
to "irresistible force", British imperialism would, in the next period,
have suffered a drastic undermining of its economic influence. This is
why the Tories sent the Task Force, and why the representatives of
British capitalism are prepared to commit enormous resources, and, if
necessary, to sacrifice the lives of thousands of workers to recover the
Islands.
Mobilising mass opposition
THE TASK OF Marxists is to explain the real reasons
for the war, laying bare the class motives of both the Junta and the
Tories, exposing the real war-aims of both Argentine capitalism and
British capitalism. We are against this capitalist war. But it is a
question of how to oppose the war, how to appeal to the majority of
workers in order to mobilise effective mass opposition to the war. Mere
denunciation of the war and calls to withdraw the Task Force will
neither be listened to by the capitalists nor will they get a response
from the majority of workers.
The representatives of British capitalism will not
abandon the armed defence of their vital interests on the world arena.
They are just as ready to sacrifice workers in war as they are to
exploit them in peacetime. Thatcher will brush aside calls to withdraw
the fleet. Nor will the Tories be prepared to accept the arbitration of
the United Nations. The inability of the UN to act on the Falklands
crisis in any case confirms the impotence of the dis-United Nations. Any
diplomatic compromise which threatened to cut across the interests of
British imperialism would be vetoed by Britain in the Security Council.
[9]
To force the withdrawal of the Task Force would
require a general strike, with the workers taking power into their own
hands. While the capitalists retain the power, they will use it to
defend their class interests, whether at home or abroad. But in the
present situation a call for a general strike to end the war would get
no support, even from the advanced sections of the working class. Even
the ultra-left sects who, all forlorn, cry ‘Stop the war!’ have not had
the temerity to call for a general strike. Such a slogan would be hollow
through and through. It would immediately be shown to be completely
unrealistic. Nor could the call to stop the war or withdraw the Fleet
provide a basis even for a mass campaign of demonstrations, meetings,
and agitation – because it leaves unanswered, in the eyes of workers,
the vital question of the rights of the Falkland Islanders and the
question of opposing a vicious military-police dictatorship in
Argentina.
Only the bringing down of the Tory government can
clear the way for ending the war and a solution to the Falklands crisis.
At the moment, the Tories have the backing of the right-wing leaders of
the Labour Party and the trade unions. Without it, they could not have
gone to war. The opposition of Michael Foot, the Labour Party leader,
and some of the other Parliamentary lefts has been completely
inconsistent and ineffectual. Foot supported the sending of the Task
Force – but on the eve of the first engagement argued that it should not
be used! As if the Tories sent a war fleet 8,000 miles across the
Atlantic merely as a diplomatic display!
Their refusal to criticise the class aims of the
Tories make the opposition of the Labour Party leaders seem like
inconsistent, carping criticism. Labour’s ranks must therefore demand an
end to the bi-partisan policy on the Falklands, an end to the unofficial
coalition that exists between Labour’s right wing and the Tories on this
issue.
The Falklands war is not a reason for calling off
the struggle against the Tories – on the contrary, the slaughter of the
war and the additional drain on British capitalism, for which big
business will try to make the workers pay, underlines the urgency of
stepping up the struggle to bring down the Tory government.
The labour movement should be mobilised to force a
general election to open the way for the return of a Labour government
to implement socialist policies at home and abroad. [10] Victory of a
socialist government in Britain would immediately transform the
situation in relation to the Falklands. The Junta would no longer be
able to claim to be fighting British imperialism.
A socialist government would make a class appeal to
the Argentinean workers. A Labour government could not just abandon the
Falklanders and let Galtieri get on with it. But it would continue the
war on socialist lines. First, a socialist government would carry
through the democratisation of the British armed forces, introducing
trade union rights and the election of officers. Working class interests
cannot be defended under the direction of an authoritarian, officer
caste, which is tied to the capitalist class by education, income and
family and class loyalties. The use of force against the Junta, however,
would be combined with a class appeal to the workers in uniform. British
capitalism will probably defeat the Junta, but only through a bloody
battle and at an enormous cost in lives. Using socialist methods, a
Labour government could rapidly defeat the dictatorship, which was
already facing a threat from the Argentinean working class when Galtieri
embarked on his diversionary battle with British imperialism.
A Labour government would give support to a struggle
to overturn the Junta and end the rule of capitalism in Argentina. A
socialist government in Britain would make it clear that, while
defending the rights of the Falkland Islanders, it entirely repudiated
the neo-imperialist interests and aims of British capitalism. It would
support the expropriation of British banks and businesses in Argentina,
along with the nationalisation of Argentinean big business and finance
capital.
A Labour government would propose a Socialist
Federation of Britain and Argentina, including the Falkland Islands.
Under capitalism, the two countries have been linked to a considerable
extent by investment and trade. A Socialist Federation, which would have
world-wide ramifications, would end neo-colonial exploitation and open
up planned development of the economies, which would have enormous
advantages for the workers of Britain, Argentina, and the Falklands.
[11]
It is vital to oppose the capitalist war with a
clear policy on these lines. Such a policy can win the support of the
advanced workers, and also wider layers of the working class, countering
the lying propaganda of the capitalist class. In the course of the
crisis, the television and especially the press have sunk to new depths,
attempting to whip up vile chauvinist and warmongering sentiments. In
attacking its sleazy rival, the Sun, the Daily Mirror said that it had
sunk from the gutter to the sewer – a description which also fits the
Mirror and the rest of the capitalist press!
The Tories are hypocritically exploiting the
workers’ instinctive hatred of the Junta, which they see as a
blood-stained fascist regime. The Tories are also attempting to exploit
the workers’ feelings of solidarity with their brothers and sisters in
the army, the navy, and the merchant navy. Only a clear Marxist policy,
which takes all the factors of the situation into account, can win mass
support and mobilise effective opposition to this war of rival
capitalist classes.
Lenin’s approach
THE POSITION TAKEN by some of the ultra-left sects,
who actually came out in support of the Junta, could only play into the
hands of the Tories and British imperialism. Fearful that they would be
diverted by the pressure of patriotic, bourgeois sentiments, they tried
to insure themselves against opportunism by subscribing to an inflexible
policy. The only way consistently to oppose the British bourgeoisie,
they claim, is to support the enemy of the British bourgeoisie – even if
this happens to be Argentina’s military-police dictatorship! From the
correct starting point of opposition to capitalist war, the ultra-left
sects (who claim to be Marxists) hared off down a dead-end street.
In support of this crazy logic, which has led the
sects into giving uncritical support to the Junta, they claim Marxists
must always adopt a ‘defeatist’ position. They cite Lenin’s
revolutionary defeatism of 1914, when the Bolshevik leader said that,
for Russian Marxists, the defeat of the Tsarist autocracy would be the
most favourable outcome of the imperialist war and when Lenin put
forward the slogan of ‘civil war’. The sects, however, have picked up
Lenin’s slogan of 1914 without bothering to examine the circumstances
and without understanding Lenin’s thinking.
Every situation must be analysed concretely, and
there are enormous differences between the imperialist war of 1914-18
and the present armed conflict between Britain and Argentina. But the
sects have not even understood Lenin’s position in 1914-18. If we were
to accept their view, the leader of the Russian revolution would appear
as little more than a dogmatic fool. In a discussion at the third
congress of the Communist International in 1921, in answer to ultra-left
ideas being put forward by some of the German Communists, Lenin
explained his tactics during the war. "At the beginning of the war we
Bolsheviks adhered to a single slogan – that of civil war, and a
ruthless one at that... But when we came back to Russia in March 1917 we
changed our position entirely". At the start of the war, Lenin
explained, because of the depths of the betrayal by the Social
Democratic and Labour leaders, who patriotically fell in behind their
own capitalists, it was necessary to inoculate the advanced layers of
workers against patriotic, capitalist ‘defencism’. "It was important
then to form a definite and resolute core".
However, in 1917 Lenin rejected the slogan of civil
war and an immediate move to overthrow the Provisional government of
Kerensky. "Our subsequent stand was correct too. It proceeded from the
assumption that the masses had to be won over". In 1917 the Bolsheviks
had to take into account the "honest defencism" of the workers and
peasants, not support for the Russian ruling class, but solidarity with
their class brothers in the army and defence of a homeland identified
with the interests of ordinary workers and peasants.
Not for a moment did Lenin abandon opposition to the
imperialist war. The Bolsheviks opposed the new offensive in 1917, when
the Russian armies, under the direction of the Provisional government,
renewed the war effort on behalf of the ruling class. But crude antiwar
slogans and the call for civil war could not have won the support of a
majority of workers.
Never did Lenin doubt the need to overthrow the
Provisional government, which was incapable of ending the war and,
despite depending on the support of the workers’ Soviets, was attempting
to save the rule of the capitalists and landlords. But unless the
Bolsheviks were to attempt to overthrow the Provisional government
through the action of only a minority of the working class – an idea
Lenin rejected as ‘Blanquist’ (putschist) [12] – they had to campaign to
win over the majority of the working class. Would the sects of today say
that Lenin was ‘opportunist’?
The October revolution, which overthrew the
Provisional government and put power in the hands of the workers’ and
peasants’ Soviets, demonstrated the correctness of Lenin’s strategy and
tactics. Arguing against ultra-left ideas in 1921, Lenin said: "Our sole
strategy now is to become stronger, hence cleverer, more sensible, more
‘opportunistic’". Lenin was using "opportunistic" ironically, to
underline his rejection of an ultra-left approach based on the
mechanical repetition of "left" slogans regardless of their effect on
the majority of workers. Lenin’s speech on this question is printed in
his Collected Works, volume 42, pp324-328.
Trotsky’s attitude
LEON TROTSKY ALSO took up the Marxists who, on the
eve of the Second World War, wanted to repeat Lenin’s slogans of 1914.
The Second World War, Trotsky explained, was a continuation of the first
imperialist world war – but not a repetition. Similarly, the slogans of
the Marxists were a continuation, but not a repetition. They had to be
worked out and deepened in relation to the concrete situation in the
Second World War. Trotsky explained this in his article ‘Bonapartism,
Fascism and War’ (Writings 1939-40, p411).
"During the last war not only the proletariat as a
whole but also its vanguard and, in a certain sense, the vanguard of the
vanguard was caught unawares. The elaboration of the principles of
revolutionary policy toward the war began at a time when the war was
already in full blaze and the military machine exercised unlimited rule.
One year after the outbreak of the war, the small revolutionary minority
was still compelled to accommodate itself to a centrist majority at the
Zimmerwald Conference [the 1915 meeting of internationalists in
Switzerland – Ed].
"Prior to the February revolution and even
afterwards the revolutionary elements felt themselves to be not
contenders for power but the extreme left opposition. Even Lenin
relegated the socialist revolution to a more or less distant future...
If that is how Lenin viewed the situation, then there is hardly any need
of talking about the others.
"This political position of the extreme left wing
expressed itself most graphically on the question of the defence of the
fatherland.
"In 1915 Lenin referred in his writings to
revolutionary wars which the victorious proletariat would have to wage.
But was a question of an indefinite historical perspective and not of
tomorrow’s task. The attention of the revolutionary wing was centred on
the question of the defence of the capitalist fatherland. The
revolutionists naturally replied to this question in the negative. This
was entirely correct. But while this purely negative answer served as
the basis for propaganda and for training the cadres, it could not
win the masses, who did not want a foreign conqueror.
"In Russia prior to the war the Bolsheviks
constituted four-fifths of the proletarian vanguard, that is, of the
workers participating in political life (newspapers, elections, etc.).
Following the February revolution the unlimited rule passed into the
hands of defensists, the Mensheviks and the SRs [the Social
Revolutionary Party, based on the peasantry – Ed]. True enough, the
Bolsheviks in the space of eight months conquered the overwhelming
majority of the workers. But the decisive role in this conquest was
played not by the refusal to defend the bourgeois fatherland
but by the slogan ‘All Power to the Soviets’. And only by this
revolutionary slogan! The criticism of imperialism, its militarism,
the renunciation of the defence of bourgeois democracy and so on could
have never conquered the overwhelming majority of the people to the side
of the Bolsheviks..." [Our emphasis added – Ed]
Absurd positions
YET THE ULTRA-LEFT sects of today, determined to
demonstrate their intransigent ‘Marxist’ approach, continue to advance
slogans based on their misconception of ‘defeatism’. Even they –
confused as they are – do not claim that they have the support of a
majority of the working class. But how do they think they can win a
majority to oppose the war aims of British capitalism, to force the
Tories to abandon their military adventure? Apparently, they believe it
can be done by support for the Junta, when most workers have an
instinctive hatred for what they see as a ‘fascist’ regime, and an
understandable desire to see it defeated. The Tories, of course, are
cynically exploiting the workers’ anti-fascist feelings; but support for
the Junta would put Marxists beyond the pale in the eyes of workers,
leaving the Tories free hypocritically to capitalise on the ‘fight
against fascism’.
The pseudo-Marxists also believe, it seems, that
support for a socialist opposition to the war can be won through a
policy which abandons the Falkland Islanders to the tender mercies of
the Junta, writing off their rights in favour of the Junta’s legalistic
claim to the land under their feet.
The most monstrous absurdity of the sects’ position,
however, is the idea that workers can be won to a socialist position on
the basis of calling for the defeat of the Task Force, calling literally
– as representatives of the sects have stated in public – for "the
sinking of the fleet"! They are in favour of the slaughter of workers in
the ranks of the navy and army, and on this basis they will win mass
support from the working class! This is a travesty of Marxism which, in
so far as it has any effect at all, can only play into the hands of the
Tories and Labour’s right, allowing them to portray ‘Marxists’ as idiots
who support the Argentinean junta.
This is not all, however. Not content with
distorting Lenin, the sects also drag Trotsky in to support their
ludicrous position. Did not Trotsky say just before the Second World War
– the sects argue – that, in the event of war between Britain and
Brazil, "in this case I will be on the side of ‘fascist’ Brazil against
‘democratic’ Great Britain". Trotsky made this remark in 1938 in an
interview with Mateo Fossa, the leader of Trotsky’s supporters in (as it
happens) Argentina. (The interview is published in Writings of Leon
Trotsky, 1938-39, pp31-36)
Again, the pseudo-Marxists have taken Trotsky’s
remarks completely out of context, without analysing the situation or
Trotsky’s reasoning. He was obviously dealing with a hypothetical case.
But he formulated his position sharply in this way in order to counter
the idea, then being peddled by the Stalinist leadership of the
Comintern and the world’s ‘Communist’ Parties, that the struggle of
‘democracy’ against ‘fascism’ should take priority over a revolutionary
struggle against imperialism. In the interests of the Russian
bureaucracy’s diplomatic deals with the ruling classes of the capitalist
democracies, the revolutionary struggle internationally was postponed
indefinitely.
Trotsky explained that in the coming world war –
which he clearly predicted from the middle of the 1930s – the capitalist
class, if faced with an aggravated crisis and mounting opposition to
their rule, could easily throw off its democratic mask and resort to
totalitarian, fascist forms of rule. On the other hand, in colonial or
semi-colonial countries, the war could stimulate revolutionary movements
of the workers and exploited peasantry which could topple fascist
regimes.
In the case of war between Britain and Brazil, "If
England should be victorious, she will put another fascist in Rio de
Janeiro, and will place double chains on Brazil. If Brazil, on the
contrary, should be victorious, it would give a mighty impulse to
national and democratic consciousness of the country and will lead to
the overthrow of the Vargas dictatorship. The defeat of England will at
the same time deliver a blow to British imperialism and will give an
impulse to the revolutionary movement of the British proletariat". (p34)
Even in this hypothetical case, Trotsky clearly analysed the probable
processes and the alternative perspectives which would be opened up. Yet
faced with a real war in the South Atlantic at the present time, the
pseudo-Marxist sects are incapable of analysing the actual class
interests or processes involved.
Argentinean capitalism
THE JUNTA LAUNCHED its Falkland adventure under the
social crisis – to head off pressure of imminent revolution. If they
were successfully to hold on to the Falklands – which now seems unlikely
– it could temporarily strengthen the military dictatorship, prolonging
the totalitarian oppression of the Argentinean working class. Faced with
the prospect of being overthrown, the Junta, by its military action, has
brought dramatically to the fore the issue of the Falklands, a "national
grievance" fostered by Argentina’s rulers for generations precisely to
divert the attention of the people from economic and political
grievances at home.
Far from awakening the national and democratic
consciousness of the country, the seizure of the Falklands has allowed
the Junta to whip up all the worst nationalistic, patriotic prejudices
of the middle class and sections of the workers. If it were a national
war against an attempt of British imperialism to subjugate Argentina and
its people – as in Trotsky’s theoretical example – it would be entirely
different.
Marxists have always given support to national
struggles against imperialism. Trotsky advocated support for China
against Japan (after the seizure of Manchuria in 1931 and in the war
that broke out in 1937), even under the bonapartist leadership of Chiang
Kai-shek. A national struggle, despite bourgeois leadership, inevitably
arouses the working class and exploited peasantry.
Similarly, in 1935-36 Trotsky supported Abyssinia
against fascist Italy. A defeat for Mussolini’s army of invasion would
have led to the overthrow of his fascist regime in Italy. Even so,
Trotsky never recommended uncritical support for bonapartist,
national-capitalist leaders. He always stood for the independent
mobilisation of the working class on a socialist programme. In the
course of a national struggle, Marxists should demand a radical land
reform and the nationalisation of industry and finance, together with
the formation of Soviets and a struggle to take the power into their
hands. This is the only basis on which genuine liberation from
imperialism can be achieved.
But the Argentinean Junta’s war over the Falklands
is not a war of national liberation against imperialism. On the
contrary, in seizing the Falklands the Argentine Junta is pursuing
imperialistic aims on the part of Argentinean capitalism.
Galtieri invaded the Islands for political reasons,
to head off revolution and save his regime. But in the background are
the Argentinean financiers and capitalists who are eager to get their
hands on the profits potentially to be drawn from Antarctic oil and
other natural resources. Such a development of Antarctica, it is true,
would almost certainly be in conjunction with the American
multi-nationals, to whom the Argentinean capitalists would be junior
partners. Argentinean capitalism is still subordinate to international
big business, especially American capitalism, as its massive foreign
debts testify.
Nevertheless, in the past period of world economic
upswing, Argentinean capitalism developed a semi-industrialised basis of
its own. It is ludicrous to portray Argentinean capitalism as a
completely dependent, ‘comprador’ capitalism, dominated by the agents of
foreign capital. This is the analysis offered by some of the sects in an
attempt to justify their support for the Junta.
A few crucial statistics reveal the absurdity of
this position. In 1979, industry accounted for 45% of GNP, compared to
13% for agriculture (and 42% for services). Manufactured goods, it is
true, account for only 22.7% of the country’s exports, compared to 65.5%
for food and agriculture, thus reflecting the weakness of Argentine
industry on world markets. But the urban population now accounts for
over 82% of the total population. Twenty-nine per cent of the active
population work in industry, as compared to only 14% in agriculture (57%
work in the enormous service sector). In other words, Argentina, despite
its continued neo-colonialist subservience to American, West European
and Japanese big business, nevertheless has all the characteristics of a
semi-industrialised capitalist economy.
If there were an Argentinean population on the
Islands, subjected to British rule against their will, the situation
would be different. Then there might be a case for the "national
liberation" of the Islands. But this is not the case. Apart from one or
two Argentines married to Islanders, there have been no Argentineans on
the Islands for 150 years.
Pseudo-radicalism
ARGENTINA’S DICTATORS ARE following a well-trodden
path. Mussolini, for instance, attempted to whip up nationalistic,
reactionary fervour over "Irredenta", so-called "unredeemed national
territory", calling for the return of Trieste to Italy. Hitler,
similarly, mounted a nationalistic agitation campaign for the return of
the Saar from France and the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. In these
cases, however, the majority of the population had linguistic and
cultural ties. In the Saarland and the Sudetenland the majority were
German speaking. In these cases, however, Trotsky did not support the
claim of ‘fascist’ Germany against ‘democratic’ France or ‘democratic’
Czechoslovakia.
Under the Versailles Treaty which followed Germany’s
defeat in the First World War, the Saar was placed under League of
Nations administration (with its valuable coal mines in the hands of
France). Under the Treaty, there was to be a referendum in 1935 to
decide whether the Saarland should be autonomous, come under French
control or be handed back to Germany. Trotsky’s position was
unequivocal: despite the historical and cultural links of the Saar
population with Germany, he advocated that the Marxists should demand
autonomy and fight the incorporation of the Saarland into Germany and
oppose the bringing of the Saarland’s population under the heel of the
Nazi jackboot. Initially, the Stalinist leaders of the German Communist
Party favoured German annexation – a position denounced by Trotsky as
"the cowardice of pseudo-radicalism".
Answering the idea that Germany’s national claim
should take precedence over the political interests of the Saarland’s
population, Trotsky wrote: "to rally to Hitlerite Germany in practice,
i.e. through the referendum, means, theoretically speaking, to put
national mysticism above the class interests and psychologically to
conduct a really cur-like policy. Naturally, only traitors can demand
annexation at present, for that means to sacrifice the most concrete and
vital questions of the German workers in the Saar territory to the
abstract, national factor".
In the event, Hitler managed to gain a big majority
for incorporation into Germany – a Nazi success which Trotsky bluntly
attributed to the bankruptcy and cowardice of the leaders of both the
Communist Party and the Social Democracy, who, despite coming out in
favour of autonomy, failed to win the support of the Saarland workers
for a policy of opposition to the Nazis.
The Junta’s "abstract" national claim to the
Falkland Islands does not even have the "justification" – in any case
rejected by Trotsky – of an Argentinean population on the Islands.
There is not a grain of genuine Marxism in the
position of the ultra-left sects. They have come out in support of the
Junta. They are indifferent to the rights of the Falkland Islanders.
They are indifferent to the fate of the workers in the ranks of the
British forces, even welcoming their defeat at the hands of the Junta.
Not only will this position fail to win the support of workers, but it
will play into the hands of the Tories and British capitalism.
Only a campaign based on a clear, concrete analysis
of all the factors involved in the Falklands crisis and based on the
clear policies we have outlined, will be effective in mobilising
opposition to the Tories and British imperialism.
Footnotes:
[1] After the surrender of Argentinean forces on 14
June 1983, Galtieri was forced out by mass protests. Elections in 1983
were won by the Radical, Raul Alfonsin, who defeated the Peronist
candidate, promising to curb the power of the military.
[2] A military junta, led by general Jorge Videla,
seized power in 1976. Videla was replaced by general Roberta Viola, who
in turn was ousted by general Leopoldo Galtieri, who favoured a
nationalistic foreign policy.
[3] Shortly after becoming prime minister in 1979,
Margaret Thatcher approved a plan, drawn up by her foreign secretary,
Nicholas Ridley, to open negotiations with Argentina. The proposal was
that sovereignty of the Falklands/Malvinas would be conceded to
Argentina on condition of an immediate long-term leaseback of the
islands to Britain. This met with a storm of opposition from right-wing
Tory MPs, and was abandoned. In June 1981, announcement of a round of
defence cuts included the withdrawal of the naval survey ship,
Endurance, from the South Atlantic.
[4] President Ronald Reagan, right-wing Republican
president of the US, 1981-89.
[5] Alexander Haig, Reagan’s secretary of state, who
attempted through shuttle diplomacy to broker a peace agreement between
the Thatcher government and the Galtieri junta.
[6] The Argentinean junta backed the Bolivia coup of
1981 and supported the military-backed governments of Paraguay and
Uruguay. The US was also grooming the Argentinean military to play a
‘counter-insurgency’ role in Central America, including against the
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and the opposition forces of the FMNLF (Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front) in the El Salvador civil war. (See:
Lynn Walsh, US Latin America Policy Goes Up in Smoke, Militant, 28 May
1982)
[7] A professor of international relations at the
London School of Economics and Oxford University.
[8] The announcement of the withdrawal of the
British naval ship, Endurance, in June 1981 appeared to signal to Buenos
Aires that Britain was no longer committed to defending the Falklands/Malvinas.
When Argentinean scrap metal merchants landed on South Georgia Island
with a small Argentinean naval force on 19 March 1982, the Thatcher
government protested to Buenos Aries but took no action. This contrasted
with the immediate dispatch of a small naval task force by the Labour
government under James Callaghan in 1977, when a group of Argentinean
‘scientists’ landed on South Thule Island. Later, the Franks Committee
catalogued a whole series of blunders but, in a typical official
whitewash, concluded that no one in the British government could be
blamed for the Argentinean invasion – and the war.
[9] To appease public opinion in Britain and
internationally, the Thatcher government went along with a number of
peace initiatives, calculating that the Galtieri junta would not accept
them. But any further peace talks were effectively ruled out with the
sinking by a British nuclear-powered submarine of the ageing Argentinean
battleship, General Belgrano, when it was sailing away from the
Falklands and British naval forces. This atrocious action, which
resulted in the drowning of 368 Argentinean sailors, was personally
ordered by Thatcher.
[10] The way our demands are formulated in this
section reflects the fact that at that time Militant was a Marxist
tendency in the Labour Party, which we still characterised as a
bourgeois-workers’ party (bourgeois leaders, but with workers within its
ranks and drawing on mass working-class support), though the leadership
was moving rapidly to the right at that time (conducting an offensive to
drive the Marxists out of the party). The "return of a Labour government
to implement socialist policies" was based on the idea of a
transformation of the party from below on the basis of mass
working-class mobilisation and the adoption of a socialist programme. In
fact, Thatcher’s Falklands victory, facilitated by the Labour leaders,
reinforced her attacks on the British workers (eg the defeat of the
1984-85 miners’ strike), which in turn accelerated the metamorphosis of
the Labour Party into a capitalist party. Militant became Militant
Labour in 1992, contesting elections under its own banner, and
subsequently launched the Socialist Party in 1997.
[11] In retrospect, the call for "a Socialist
Federation of Britain and Argentina" may appear somewhat abstract.
Before the collapse of the Stalinist states, it is true, there were
close economic, military, and political connections between Cuba and the
Soviet Union, though not a formal federal structure. Today, there are
proposals for closer links between Venezuela and Cuba. In the case of
links between countries on different continents, the call for a
‘Socialist Alliance’ might be more appropriate. At the time of the
Falklands/Malvinas war we had no contact with Marxists in Argentina, and
it was therefore inevitable that our programme to end the war and
transform both Britain and Argentina in the interest of the working
class was of a general character. A more concrete programme, especially
in relation to Argentina, could only have been worked out through
collaboration between Marxist forces in Britain and Argentina.
[12] August Blanqui (1805-81) was a French socialist
who advocated revolution through insurrectionary uprising, organised
secretly by a devoted band of revolutionaries.
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